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Preparing the Psychological Space for Peacemaking
Gabrielle Rifkind
Oxford Process
Nita Yawanarajah
Oxford Process
Peace processes fail for many reasons, but one of the critical factors is the state of mind of
the participants around the peace table. Often the atmosphere is one of mistrust and
suspicion: the traumatic effects of the conflict and the degree of suffering makes the parties
likely to be more interested in retribution than accommodation. This state of mind keeps
conflict parties rigidly and emotionally attached to their positions and often psychologically
blocked from being able to engage productively in a peace process and achieve outcomes
that meet their best interests.
This article proposes that to make conflict resolution efforts more effective, conflict
parties need help to become psychologically ready to enter a peace process. It argues that
any commitment to a psychological process must be understood in the context of geopolitical
realities, and it recognizes that power dynamics are a critical piece of any assessment of
what will bring about an end to conflict. It makes a plea to understand how and why
individuals and parties are behaving as they are around the peace table, in terms of power
dynamics and human motivations, and how they can be better prepared.
A methodology is needed that can transform the intense emotions of war into strategic
calculations and in doing so to help get to the end of conflict. This article advocates the
creation of a safe space, where conflict parties can explore their feelings, internal narratives,
and personal motives and understand that these intense emotions may not be serving their
best interest. The aim is to work with the parties to help them abandon their rigid emotional
attachments to their positions, modify their expectations, and achieve an improved state of
“psychological readiness” that allows them to be in a better state of mind to participate
around the peace table.
___________________________________________________________________________

Mediation

is currently the most prevalent form of dispute resolution in managing or
resolving violent conflict. While the field of mediation has made tremendous strides in
embedding academic research and professional training, the real challenge is determining
how to operationalize these theories. The long unresolved Israel-Palestine conflict and, more
recently, the continually unsuccessful rounds of international mediation in the Syria and
Yemen conflicts demonstrate the limits of current mediation practice. A better approach is
needed: one that employs an efficient and effective toolkit for the twenty-first century with a
methodology that prepares parties psychologically to engage around the peace table.
Violence hardens the heart and calcifies the mind, and so it is no wonder that parties are
often not ready to enter talks to resolve violent disputes through negotiation or mediation.
They are not in a state of mind to make the necessary compromises; instead, they often
continue to see the world in a binary equation of good/evil, enemy/friend, or black/white.
And when, or if, they do agree to participate in talks, their strategy reflects the conflict
dichotomy of a win/lose outcome. There are no shades of gray: alternate viewpoints or
options are vehemently rejected. The negotiation room becomes a battlefield of words, with
the parties trying to achieve through negotiation what they had hoped to achieve through
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violence. In addition, the cost, time, effort, and emotional trauma of violent conflict add to
the often-unyielding positions of the parties, regardless of political and military realities.
Current academic knowledge on mediation argues that for mediation to be successful, the
conditions must be ripe and the parties must be ready. 1 Ripeness is often described as a
moment in the conflict when parties are symmetrical in power, but when the conflict dynamic
is about to shift to the weaker party.2 At this timely juncture, when the potential exists for a
successful end to the conflict, an offer of mediation is most likely to be accepted. Recent
knowledge has also advanced the idea of readiness, championing the need for a broad central
coalition within the conflicting parties before they can embrace an offer of mediation.3
Although knowledge of ripeness and readiness has advanced the abilities of mediation
practitioners to define opportune moments for successful mediation, these theories have not
sufficiently helped practitioners to identify those moments while mediation is being carried
out. Current efforts are often aimed at consulting the parties on their positions, advising them
on negotiating strategies, and training them for negotiations. Well-meaning as they are, these
efforts are rarely able to move disputants from the emotionally intransigent space that they
find themselves in after years of war and trauma.
The emotional world of mediation is hardly a consideration in current international
mediation practice. This gap is likely caused by several factors. The field of politics and
conflict resolution is often defined by rationality and populated by those with formal
education. These characteristics, often a product of a Western approach to learning, are
influenced by Cartesian philosophy, in which the primacy of logic and reason are
unquestioned. The field is also highly male-dominated at the upper echelons of decision
making and leadership, where being emotionally attuned is considered a feminine trait.4 Also,
in the practice of international mediation today, the choice of mediator is influenced far more
by a candidate’s nationality, leverage, and prior success than by his or her empathy and
emotional intelligence, which reflect culture, gender, and informal education.
In such an arena, conflict analysts and practitioners are highly unlikely to understand the
logic of weak and disorganized parties that may choose to contend with a militarily stronger
and superior force. Moreover, they are unlikely to understand why parties may be willing to
endure further suffering by not accepting the “reasonable” terms of settlement they have been
offered.5
This article addresses this “psychological gap” and the need for a methodology that can
help transform the emotional, reactive behavior of the conflict parties into more strategic
thinking about peace initiatives, be they negotiations or mediations.

Addressing Geopolitical Realities
Increasing the awareness of the emotional state of the different actors will be insufficient if
they are unable to understand and strategically assess the wider geopolitical context of the
conflict. Often the emotional position of a conflict party might seem unrealistic because of
their relative power and the geopolitical situation—their demands do not always match their
leverage. Most parties maintain a false estimation of their own power. They believe that they
are entitled to more because they can either continue to withstand the status quo or win on the
battlefield or because they hold the righteous position under international law.6
The Syrian conflict is instructive here; different parties became stuck in fixed positions,
often speaking in platitudes. Government parties have sat around the table saying, “Assad
must stay,” while opposition groups have insisted, “Assad must go.” This polarized
negotiating position was mirrored by governments on the international stage who have been
involved in a proxy war in Syria. The United States and Saudi Arabia have insisted Assad
must go and Russia and Iran have insisted that he should stay.
2
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A preparatory mediation process would have helped the different actors think through
their strategic options, examining questions such as: Are their expectations grounded in
reality? Will their current position increase the suffering of their people or do they have a
realistic endgame, and are they protecting the communities they represent? Members of the
Syrian opposition have struggled to find coherence among themselves; their rivalries and
competition have weakened their bargaining power to achieve their objective of regime
change. Critical opportunities may have been missed because of the state of mind of the
participants but also because the participants lack an accurate assessment of the wider
geopolitical forces at play and how this may have been translated into peacemaking.
One step in preparing parties to be psychologically ready is to enable them to see the
power realities in the conflict zone and in the larger, geopolitical situation. Another is to help
parties move away from simply insisting on their position and help them make realistic
demands consonant with their relative power, or to attain what they want by altering their
relative power. In some situations, understanding the power reality and the geopolitical
situation is straightforward. Verifiable battle losses, including the loss of personnel, strategic
locations, and territory, make it easy to confront parties with reality. In such a situation, little
persuasion is required to pivot parties from unrealistic positions to their actual relative power
positions. Parties who find themselves in this situation often look to the preparation team to
advise them about how to maximize their gains or what they can get in the negotiating room
in keeping with their relative power. Often, however, conflict parties who have been
psychologically affected by the conflict are not yet ready to accept the geopolitical situation
or the outcome they can achieve with the real bargaining power they have.

The Psychological State as a Result of Conflict
Addressing the geopolitics of power will then need to be placed in a bed of understanding the
deep emotions that are often blocking any movement forward. These emotions may reflect
the parties’ sense of powerlessness and may be an expression of the difficulties they are
facing in the effort to transform their emotional content into strategic power.7 Rage, anger,
grief, and distrust preside. In this tumultuous state, parties are rarely able to hear advice, face
reality, or make the necessary strategic calculations to promote the best interests of those they
represent. Accepting anything less than what they want and what in their perception is right
and just will often feel like a betrayal to their cause.
War creates the conditions for human regression, where the conflict parties have often
done terrible things to each other. Those involved in negotiating an end to the conflict justify
their own disturbing and brutal actions in the name of war. These are not the conditions for
self-awareness. It is far more likely to find the parties in a deep state of denial, particularly
about the horrors they have committed on the enemy, and the suffering they have caused their
own people by not finding a solution earlier. This kind of denial often creates a rigid mindset
in which the leadership believes in the rightness of their cause and their own interpretation of
events, where they have contributed a narrative to justify the righteousness of their own
behavior. Within this frame of mind, several psychological states and interests will be
obstructive to peacemaking.
Trying to impose what is “rational” or “logical” at this point without addressing the
parties’ emotional concerns surrounding the issues will often create a breakdown of talks.
Most people are capable of understanding logic, but they do not make important life
decisions based on what they think about an issue. Rather, people, particularly in conflict
environments, are more likely to make their decisions based on how they feel about the issue.
At this juncture, what the parties need is not advice, negotiation, strategy, or training. What
they need is someone to listen to them with empathy, which means getting into the mind of
3
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the other and understanding their experience and why there is an intensity of emotion that is
sitting in the way of pursuing their own or their group’s best interest.

Creating Safe Spaces for the Parties
The preparatory work involves creating a containing and safe space where those who are to
be around a future peace table are able to express intense emotions. At this early stage, the
hostility and suspicion between the conflict parties is often so great that it will be impossible
for them to be in the same room. Being placed together will most likely only highlight and
exacerbate their differences. Parties may be more concerned about exacting retribution and
making the other side suffer than about working with their enemy to find a solution. The pain
of losing their friends, family, home, and livelihood is likely to have resulted in hardened
attitudes and a gap between the warring parties that seems unbridgeable. Thus, the parties
will need separate, safe spaces.
A safe space is a physical space that is warm and inviting, where the environment is
quiet, relaxed, informal, and culturally friendly. A warm and comfortable room is a far more
intimate space and therefore a more appropriate space in which to hold confidential and
personal discussions than a large conference room or the lobby of a hotel. The preparation
team would need to identify a space befitting the depth of feelings within the conflict parties
to help ensure that they feel relaxed and able to speak openly. A safe space enhances the
quality of the discussions, in particular, their degree of informality. Discussions that have an
informal style are usually “personal” and “off the record.” The more formal and high level
the interlocutor’s personality and position, the less likely the interlocutor is to achieve a
quality of informality in discussions with the conflict parties. It is the job of the mediator to
act as a container and make it safe for parties to try, with the mediator’s help to translate their
emotions into strategic thinking.

Encouraging the Parties to Express Intense Emotions
Listening is the first step to preparing the parties to enter a peace process with a more
strategic outlook. It is important that the parties feel that they are heard, that their emotional
experiences are recognized and taken seriously. Helping them process their feelings will
involve listening to them express their political views and gradually helping them see how
their views are shaped by their own internal narratives, biases, and motives. This process is
slow and often requires enormous patience and strategic questioning from the listener.
Moreover, for the process to be successful, the listener must demonstrate genuine interest,
asking open questions that allow a deep exploration of the individual or parties’ narratives,
especially how they have been constructed and whether there is a possibility of the parties’
being open to different ways of thinking.
Once the combatant feels that he or she has been heard and that his or her emotions have
been validated, the listener may think it is important to challenge the narrative. The extent to
which the expression of these emotions should be encouraged, however, before the narrative
is challenged requires careful consideration. The listener must be conscious of the risk that
individuals and their groups will become stuck in a state of victimhood; too much
encouragement may risk affording legitimacy to individuals and parties who wear their
trauma as a badge of honor. Thus, finding the optimum time for challenging the narrative is a
delicate balancing act.

4
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Identifying Values
The intention is to help translate or elevate the participants’ emotions into more strategic
calculations. As part of the process for doing this it can be helpful for participants to identify
their values: What are the things they care about? What are the ideas they deeply value?
Here, it may be useful to differentiate between individual values and group values. It is not
only parties’ outermost feelings that need to be listened to; it is also important to explore the
deeply ingrained values that have shaped their ideology and belief systems. Identifying these
at an early stage can be a critical part of the work.
Those who have fought in the conflict often express a devotion to core values—such as
the welfare of their family and country or their commitment to religion, honor, and justice.
When they believe they are being taken advantage of or asked to give up their core values,
they can become more extreme in their positions. A vacuum may be created that leads to
more violent behavior or a breakdown of the self. Thus, it is important to identify what they
care about in order to understand what is negotiable and what is non-negotiable.
Scott Atran has spent considerable time talking with extremist groups in Afghanistan,
Iraq, and Palestine, exploring the idea of non-negotiable values, which he terms “sacred
values.”8 In his book Talking to the Enemy he identifies sacred values as the values people
hold inside, which may involve honor, protecting their family, or avoiding humiliation. These
deeply ingrained values make up one’s ideological belief systems. For example, a fighter’s
belief that his most important responsibility is to feed his family or protect the family honor
must be addressed before that fighter can be integrated back into society. As Rifkind and
Picco point out: “Any deal that feeds the humiliation or the sense of marginalization is likely
to fuel further violence. Therefore, negotiators must be capable of understanding the
sensitivities and wounds that have shaped ideological rigidity.”9 Establishing these red lines
is essential preparatory work.
In practice, sacred values are seldom susceptible to being dislodged. These personal
thoughts and beliefs are often deep within our DNA and thus are part of our identity from
birth.10 For this reason, the theory of managing radical differences, which is explored later in
this article, becomes a relevant and important methodology. It does not assume that people
will change their minds or see the other person’s point of view; it advocates for people to
establish their red lines and their areas of mutual self-interest. Though establishing these lines
is essential work, it does not in any way undermine the importance of listening at this early
stage.

Changing Minds
Theories of psychological change and power, pressure and leverage have much to say about
how people change minds and what might influence their negotiating position. Often clients
or combatants remain competitive and are unlikely to be interested in a change of position;
they are more likely to want to apportion blame entirely to the other side. It is probably too
painful for them to examine their motivations for war and to confront the fact that their
participation in war may have been a futile exercise causing suffering, destruction, and huge
numbers of deaths. The desire to remain rigidly attached to the motivation to go to war is
powerful, and self-examination can cause a crisis of identity.
Psychologically, it is almost impossible to realize and accept that one has been mistaken
for decades and that the horrors of the past could have been avoided. As the Israeli writer
David Grossman points out, “Behind the deafening noise of shrill political rhetoric, in every
Israeli and Palestinian’s soul there is a dark, silent place in which they know all of the
horrible suffering of this conflict was utterly futile and useless.”11 This is the state of mind in
which parties often face each other across the table.
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Psychological theories have much to say about why people resist change, block it, or
even create a delusional narrative to reinforce their position. These theories are relevant to
peacemaking when those involved in conflict have done terrible things to each other and find
it easier to live in a state of denial than to recognize that some of the aggressive and
potentially destructive behavior they have engaged in has done little to further the peace and
much to stimulate the war.
Those involved in conflict may be susceptible to creating a delusional narrative.
Examples include an unrealistic assessment of the power they have or the inability to
accurately calculate an achievable endgame. Part of the preparatory stage, then, is to help
those involved make a more realistic assessment of their power and influence. This step will
help the parties face what is a more pragmatic and realistic outcome and will also increase
their awareness that by not coming to the peace table, the situation could worsen for their
families and their communities.
The theory of change suggests that a shock or crisis will lead to changes in both the
individual and the group.12 A history of conflict can create a “peacemaking complacency”;
not least because elite groups may benefit from a conflict environment, economically or
emotionally or in terms of their positions of power. The questions to be asked are What
would disturb this status quo and what would allow people to take the necessary risks
involved? If the level of shock is sufficient, and those who have been exposed feel that they
have already lost so much, they may become more willing to re-examine the status quo. One
can compare this situation to that of a divorcing couple. Only at the point of loss—whether it
be the loss of money, the loss of a home, or the loss of access to children—are the parties
prepared to make some of the more difficult compromises. Often when emotion has become
entrenched, parties get themselves locked into positions and do not know how to find a way
out; sometimes only a shock to the system provides the impetus for movement.
In international conflict, this shock or disruption may be part of ripening the conditions
to bring the parties to the peace table. But the entangled power relationships cannot be
ignored; when the power relationships are asymmetrical, and the weaker party has few
bargaining chips, that party is reluctant to engage. Only when the members of the weaker
party recognize a recalibration of this power balance and feel they are in a stronger position
will they be more prepared to come to the peace table.
Psychological theories do not primarily hold that people change only as a result of
disruption. Theories often assume a more benign view of human behavior and identify a
trusting and safe relationship, in which the mediator holds the interests of the client, as a
more likely precursor to change. According to this more benign view of human behavior, a
trusted interlocutor or mediator can create a safe space in which the combatants can move
beyond the emotions associated with the trauma of war and begin to think about and evaluate
strategic options. The seasoned negotiator John Alderdice makes a persuasive argument for
the importance of centralizing the preparatory process in his article “Off the Couch and
Round the Conference Table.” He argues that minds must be “heard, valued, contained,
explored and expressed” and calls for a “fluid appreciation of the emotional tone around the
table at any time.”13

Opening Up Incentives
Frequently, there are incentives to keep the status quo and for parties to remain in their
comfort zones. How can third parties help create a change in behavior, where parties would
see it in their best interest to engage positively in a peace process? Opening up the
imagination and asking probing questions can be useful; this process can elicit creative
thoughts and enable the exploration of alternate ways for parties to achieve their interests.
6
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The aim is to help parties move from rigid thinking to more creative exploration. Parties can
be asked to articulate an ideal end-state of the conflict or vision for a postconflict reality.
Exploration of the imagined end-state helps the conflict parties think about the best outcome
they could hope for, or what a future could look like.14 Once careful, sensitive work has been
done on what the parties can live with, they can begin to reframe more realistic possibilities.
This kind of engagement could be applied in the Israel-Palestine conflict to ripen the
conditions for change and incentivize the Gazans in the refugee camps. It would involve
more than just asking the usual questions, leading refugees only to repeat that they wish to
return to their homeland within the state of Israel, which in the current political climate is an
unrealizable dream. Instead, questions could be asked to stimulate the imagination, such as
What changes would offer a better life for their children? Or what would a secure future look
like?15
Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein’s nudge theory of behavioral economics may have
something to contribute to the theory of changing minds.16 It describes two distinct modes by
which information is processed: the first is rapid and feels more instinctive; the second is
more reflective and constitutes a deliberate, self-conscious reasoning. Any successful nudge
strategy has to account for both modes of thinking, because conflict between these two modes
frequently leads to an individual’s selecting a wrong option. Applying this theory to peace
building underlines the importance of mediators’ using what Thaler and Sunstein describe as
a “choice architecture.” In other words, considering how choices are presented to parties:
nudging parties with questions to help them reflect on why they want a particular outcome.
This strategy will help parties draw out and differentiate between their strategic interests and
their emotional needs.

The Role of the Mediator
Individuals who seek to take on the role of mediator must have either an intuitive knowledge
or formal training in psychological understanding to work empathetically with conflict
parties. Because the political and humanitarian urgency to make progress in the peace process
can sometimes make villains out of victims, the mediator must be careful not to emit
impatience over the emotional state of the parties and to avoid branding the parties as
obstructive because of an inability to immediately respond rationally or realistically.
Listening to parties express their feelings and reflecting these feelings with empathy allows
the parties to process their intense emotions of rage, anger, grief, and distrust. Waiting until
the interlocutors are emotionally spent allows them to be more ready and agreeable to
contemplating the next steps.
The mediator may struggle with his or her own feelings if the combatants have been
involved in horrendous acts of killing. It is not role of the mediator, however, to pass
judgment. Because it is essential that the mediator be self-aware, it may be helpful for him or
her to reflect on how he or she might have behaved in such circumstances. Mediators need to
learn to contain their feelings so that they can keep an open mind and respond
nonjudgmentally. Learning this skill may require training.

Determining When to Promote Psychological Readiness
When the parties focus solely on either emotions or reason, they are left dissatisfied, having
neglected a critical aspect of their decision-making process. To determine how to avoid this
outcome and ensure an effective peace process, we need to understand how emotions interact
with reason.
Before conflict parties enter into negotiations or mediation, they need to understand how
they feel about the conflict and they need to be able to reflect on their emotional attachments
7
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to particular positions. Being psychologically ready before engaging in talks allows the
parties to be open-minded and able to rationally consider offers from the other side or
proposals from the peacemaker rather than reacting emotionally and rejecting them.
Often, only when a peace process gets stuck because of the intransigence of one or both
sides in the conflict or the lack of trust between them do peacemakers realize that the parties
are not psychologically ready to constructively engage in peace talks.17 Peacemakers often
find that the parties are so traumatized and enraged by the war that they can do little more
than vilify the other side during the peace talks, reacting emotionally, with complete distrust
and obstinate opposition to any ideas from the other side or the peacemakers.
Helping the parties to develop their psychological readiness during the peace initiative
entails working behind the scenes, often in concert with a mediator or, in a formal peace
process, with a high-level peacemaker. Helping the parties develop psychological readiness
involves evaluating and helping to develop the ability of the conflict parties to be open to
offers, creative in developing solutions, in making realistic demands, and in offering strategic
concessions. It also means communicating with the peacemaker about when the parties are
psychologically ready to hold productive discussions.

Who Should Support Conflict Parties with Psychological Readiness?
Several types of interlocutors have the potential to promote psychological readiness. The
most appropriate ones, however, are best determined by the timing of the initiative and the
type of conflict actors. Track one or formal diplomacy may involve the use of interlocutors
who have the psychological skills to psychologically prepare the parties. But before this
process begins, mediators may play a relevant role in track two or informal diplomacy. These
lower-level interlocutors, who can maneuver without the scrutiny and attention of the media,
may find that they have easier access to the conflict parties. These interlocutors are members
of academic or other nongovernmental institutions or they may be private individuals who
have some legitimate relationship or access to the parties and have sufficient international
personality but little leverage to influence the position of the state actor.
Once a conflict has erupted and there is a de facto recognition that state sovereignty has
been reduced, formal mediation initiatives become possible. The state may continue to be
cautious about overinternationalizing the conflict and may block initiatives that have the
potential to strengthen nonstate actors or make them more equal to the state actor. In this
context, international nongovernmental organizations from other peacemaking states and
regional organizations are well placed to undertake preparatory work. An important aspect of
preparing parties to be psychologically ready is to ensure that the formal mediation team is
kept separate but informed. Doing so allows the mediation team to maintain its impartiality
but stay informed about the state of readiness of actors so the peace process can proceed at
the right pace.

Working with Spoilers, Hardliners, Moderates, and Liberals
In many conflicts, there are some individuals or groups who have a vested interest in
retaining the status quo and obstructing any peace process. They gain power, wealth, and
influence from the continuation of the war and may be responsible for recurring violence.
Preventing these individuals and groups from blocking a peace process is not about changing
their minds but, where possible, creating new sources of power, wealth, and influence in a
postconflict context and enabling them to see the opportunities within the peace process.
One of the tragic consequences of war is that people hold their positions passionately and
dogmatically, blocking any possibility for the vision and flexibility required for peacemaking
ideas to emerge. This intransigent mindset often makes parties bring their fight-to-win
8
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attitude to the negotiating table. They have little interest in understanding the other side or in
finding mutually acceptable outcomes, least of all solutions that may require power sharing
and the inclusion of the perceived defeated or wrongful party. They may prefer a military
solution to conflict resolution and therefore are likely to oppose negotiations. They may take
the posture of self-righteousness; they feel legitimate in their stubborn opposition to making
peace with the enemy. In this state of mind, thinking is often polarized and extreme and is
antithetical to the more complex and nuanced flexibility that is essential for finding creative
solutions to end the conflict.
A conflict party will also include more moderate members who feel protective of their
value system. Within this group will be a small number of members with an open and liberal
mindset, usually those who have suffered the least during the war or who have an elite
education and a worldlier outlook. They are often willing to work closely with the
peacemakers to find a solution. But because they are often a minority in a conflict party, they
are usually distrusted by the rest of group. Any agreement made with these members can
prove costly because they are rarely able to persuade the rest of the group to accept a deal. If
these liberal members play prominent roles at the beginning of a peace process, they will be
marginalized, because they are considered “sell-outs” by the rest of the party. If they become
more prominent later in the peace process, when the approaches of the “hard-liners” have
failed, they can play an important role in developing the party’s strategic thinking and
creative solutions.

Promoting Realistic Demands
When the facts about the zones of conflict remain opaque, the preparation team will have to
work with the parties to assess how realistic their demands are and to examine what is
required to bring about the power shift between the parties and within geopolitics that would
allow them to attain their political aims. This process will also involve a realistic assessment
of the parties’ ability to take responsibility for and their commitment to the effort required to
attain their desired outcome.
If in confronting these realities it becomes apparent that the parties have neither the will
nor the means to change their relative power or affect the geopolitical situation, then the
parties need to recognize that they themselves are prolonging the war and the suffering of
their own people by continuing to insist on impossible goals. Preparatory work would
therefore also need to involve helping the conflict parties determine how long they are
prepared to prolong a war that they can never win and whether they are truly representing the
interests of the people they claim to represent.

Managing Radical Differences
Helping the parties prepare psychologically is an important prerequisite of any peace process
but it requires a realistic understanding of the limitations of reconciling different conflicted
points of view. Parties with radical differences are often not open to the possibility of
compromise and may have no desire to find a compromised solution. In this instance,
defining these differences is the first step. Once this step has been taken, it usually becomes
clear that the positions of the adversaries are nearer than either assumed. What has proven
effective is recognizing and accepting the radical differences without seeking to resolve them.
Oliver Ramsbotham, who has written extensively about such radical disagreement,
emphasizes the importance of having parties identify areas of mutual self-interest in
situations where cooperation is beneficial or necessary.18 Oxford Process has developed these
ideas further by recognizing that radical differences can be managed. Our experience tells us
that rather than trying to get conflict parties to understand and accept the other, it is more
9
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productive to help them become psychologically ready to understand their relative
positions.19 Once they are confident that they are not being required to give up their beliefs,
cooperation can be promoted in areas that benefit their self-interest. With this approach, even
without resolving underlying radical differences, mutually beneficial agreements can be
reached and sustainably implemented to allow co-existence without violence. As John Paul
Lederach points out, “The capacity to live with apparent contradictions and paradoxes lies at
the heart of conflict transformation.”20

Conclusion
Peace processes take place in the midst of intense emotions. Successful peacemaking requires
flexibility and creativity and the capacity to live with apparent contradictions, which the
emotional disturbance and intensity of conflict often makes more difficult. Increasing the
awareness of the emotional state of the different actors within conflict parties and helping
them understand and strategically assess their relative power and the wider geopolitical
context of the conflict can help a mediation team advance a peace process.
A preparatory team can help prepare the conflict parties to become psychologically ready
to engage in peace negotiations. The team would aim to help participants be more aware of
their behavior and of their relative power and the geopolitical situation and help them define
what they can realistically achieve. Such preparation will also help conflict parties examine
how far their current emotions and behavior potentially enhance or obstruct their ability to
achieve what they can in a peace process. The aim of this preparatory methodology is to
provide support to official peacemaking efforts by working behind the scenes to help elevate
the emotions from the heat of war to rational thought and in so doing to prepare those in
positions of leadership to undertake strategic analysis that is in the best interests of the group
they are representing.
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